What Ryle meant by ‘knowing how’ was one’s knowing how to do something: knowing how to read the time on a clock, knowing how to call a friend, knowing how to cook a particular meal, and so forth. Authoritarian Knowledge: based on information that has been obtained from books, research studies, experts, etc. 2.) It might be advisable, then, for us to be cautious about embracing the idea that an anti-luck condition like Safety or even Safety+ impels us towards the usual interpretation of Gettier cases. In each case, your knowledge is fallible; it remains knowledge, though. Moreover, Alvin Goldman (1999) shows how, if we allow a weak sense of knowledge (whereby such knowledge is required only to be at least a true belief), we can still accommodate how people in many fields of inquiry and policy beyond philosophy purport to talk — apparently constructively, within those fields — of knowledge. If so, there could well be a kind of knowledge which is different to knowing a fact; maybe knowing a thing or entity (such as a person) is distinct from knowing a fact about that thing or entity. How much observation is needed for observational knowledge? For The spectre of a sceptical conclusion is the most obvious philosophical concern about requiring knowledge to satisfy an infallibilist standard. But the importance to your life of that truth might affect what justificatory standard would need to be met, if you are to know it to be true. It is difficult, to say the least, for us ever to know that a piece of putative knowledge would not be at all observational, so that it would be gained purely by thought or reflection. Indeed so, concludes the sceptical reasoning: if (for all that you do otherwise know about them) they might not be knowledge, then they are not sufficiently well supported by you to actually be knowledge. One version of that temptation talks of certainty — not necessarily a subjectively experienced sense of certainty, but what is usually termed an epistemic kind of certainty. Section 5.a assumed that knowledge is at least a justified true belief. This would be so, if justification is a kind of actual reliability (section 5.a) in being correct — reliability which even an entire group might therefore lack when sharing a particular belief. On sceptical reasoning in general, see DeRose and Warfield 1999.]. 5. 2009. The idea of improving one’s evidence, or one’s reliability in attaining true beliefs, is perfectly compatible with already having good support for a particular belief. Yet to form that belief on that basis is to proceed in a way that was likely to yield not only Smith’s same belief, but its being true. claim to believe that something is so they don’t always claim to know on their claims to know things. This is not necessarily because consistency in itself is always complex. Rather than continuing to rely only on what epistemologists and their students would say about such thought-experiments, Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich (2001) asked a wider range of people for their intuitive reactions, including to some Gettier cases. 2005. Stephen Hetherington By this, Gettier meant that the evidence does not logically mandate or entail the belief’s being true: the belief could have been false, even given that evidence’s being true. and the claim is warranted. That question confronts us with a radical sceptical possibility. (For different versions, see Schaffer 2005; 2007; Morton 2011.) One such approach involves attempting to understand the phenomenon in terms of other phenomena. Yet here is a counter-challenge (described more fully in Hetherington 2011c). and trans.. Dougherty, Trent. The results are epistemological — philosophical attempts to understand whatever is most fundamentally understandable about the nature and availability of knowledge. And this degree or grade could improve, as the fallibility is lessened by the improvement in the justificatory support. of Contents for the Online  Textbook. (One might not feel or notice its being so. (Still, in practice we also often could have infallibilist moments: ‘You’re not sure? “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense.” In J. Greco and E. Sosa, eds.. DeRose, Keith and Warfield, Ted A. Can there be purely or directly observational knowledge? We might regard knowing as a person’s having manifested various virtues of an intellectual nature. Do your apparent beliefs about the world fail in that way to be knowledge? That is, it would not have amounted to a basic piece of knowledge, upon which other pieces of knowledge can be based and which need not itself be based upon other pieces of knowledge. Now how is it that you come to know these things? What do these four types of knowledge have in common? Thus, we will examine some of the general kinds or forms of knowledge that epistemologists have thought it important to highlight (section 1), followed by the idea of knowledge as a kind or phenomenon at all (section 2). In particular, is it a natural kind — a naturally occurring element in the scientifically describable world? It is a way of claiming to understand the truth-conditions of utterances or thoughts, particularly of knowledge-attributions or knowledge-denials. (If we reply that it depends upon what a particular a priori known truth is about, we return to the previous paragraph’s question about knowledge gained purely by thinking. As was done for observational knowledge in section 3.b, this section mentions a few of the multitude of questions that have arisen about a priori knowledge — knowledge which would be present, if it ever is, purely by thinking, maybe through an accompanying rational insight. So it is right to ask how it is that individual cases of knowledge reach, or are acquired by, people; along with how it is that these cases of knowledge are then retained by people. How much is needed depends on what is riding on That approach has dominated epistemology’s efforts over the past fifty or so years to understand knowledge’s nature. Is that part of why humans as a natural kind (if this is what we are) have prospered so markedly? Jonathan Kvanvig (2003) calls this the value problem within epistemology. In this sense, is knowing an inherent part of how people function socially? evidence. So far, the discussion has been about fallibility, not different standards of fallibility. things. the evidence that we have reason to doubt or question. 2009. In an ‘everyday’ conversational context, when she is asked whether you know that dingoes exist, your friend may well say of you that you do. So (on this alternative interpretation), Smith’s final belief is not formed unsafely. “On the Gettier Problem Problem.” In S. Hetherington, ed.. Morton, Adam. Do people say to the new mother in the hospital nursery: ", Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License, Table (And thus we have the justified-true-belief conception of knowledge.). (It is also often described as analysing the concept of that phenomenon. As the preceding two paragraphs show, competing interpretive possibilities exist here. How much evidence is needed in order to section. Maybe it will lack, at any rate, all value beyond whatever value is inherent in the presence of a true belief — in one’s being correct at all in a belief about something at all. will be examined in the next There are various possible ways of seeking philosophical understanding of a phenomenon. It will not feel to an epistemologist as if this is happening. Although philosophers may differ on how many Maybe we can distinguish between a kind of knowledge which involves some sort of reliability (see section 5.a above), and one which adds to that reliability an appropriately aware reflectiveness about that reliability. It would make knowing’s value personal, in an existential way. Although there is a ‘gap’ of logic or information between what Smith’s evidence and reasoning claims to tell him about directly (that is, aspects of Jones) and how his final belief is made true (that is, by aspects of Smith himself), some such ‘gap’ is sometimes to be expected whenever a merely fallibilist standard for knowing is at stake. 1986. Yet some people (even if probably no epistemologists) might wish to understand knowledge in an even more deflationary way. How so? Could you unwittingly be condescending or patronising, indeed, when forbearing to assess critically whether the other person really knows? Let’s consider two of those forms of doubt. And it is often thought to accommodate the existence of different standards for knowledge-attributions. How does a person gain the warrant or the justification


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